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to institutional pressures for the adoption of sustainable
practices.
The first section of the article reviews the significant insights
gained through the use of institutional theory in the two dominant contexts of sustainability research: the ISO 14001 standard and trade association-sponsored initiatives. In the second section, I invoke both determinant and interactive arguments to develop competing hypotheses concerning adoption
of sustainable practices. I next discuss the study’s methods and
results. The article concludes with a discussion and implications
for future research.

Institutional theory has shifted from determinant to interactive arguments in recent decades, and sustainability scholarship
reflects this change. In this article, I consider whether this shift
is empirically justified. I review the use of both determinant and
interactive arguments in sustainability research and test two sets
of competing hypotheses regarding the likelihood of adoption of
sustainable practices. Through logistic regression analysis of a
sample of 391 U.S.-based firms, I find no support for hypotheses grounded in determinant arguments, but strong support for
hypotheses based on interactive arguments. The results of this
study offer implications for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. Organization Management Journal, 10: 86–96, 2013. doi:
10.1080/15416518.2013.801741

INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN SUSTAINABILITY
RESEARCH
As Scott (2008a) has noted, institutional theory has moved
from determinant to interactive arguments. In determinant
arguments, constraints on strategic behavior occur as takenfor-granted elements and unconscious conformity to traditions
generate frames for decision making (Berger & Luckmann,
1967). Institutional environments may create structural uniformity among organizations, as firms ceremoniously adopt
structures to gain institutional legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan,
1977). Through processes of institutionalization, alternatives
can become unthinkable (Zucker, 1983). Adoption of a new
organizational form may begin as a search for efficiency but
later spreads in a quest for legitimacy, in a two-stage model of
diffusion (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Uncertainty may lead to isomorphism, as institutions face coercive, normative, and mimetic
pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Interactive arguments, by contrast, acknowledge opportunities for choice and use of agency (Scott, 2008a). DiMaggio
(1988) challenged institutional theory to examine issues of
interests and agency within the process of institutionalization.
Oliver’s (1991) integration of institutional theory with resource
dependence arguments represents one of the earliest responses
to DiMaggio’s challenge. She proffers a series of strategic
responses to institutional pressures and identifies predictors of
which response an organization is likely to adopt. As Scott
(2008a) observed, Oliver’s article “pried open institutional
theory, making room for more purposive action” (p. 432).

Keywords sustainability; institutional theory; resource dependence

INTRODUCTION
Management scholars have employed the lens of institutional theory to examine the adoption and diffusion of
natural environmental standards and practices. A significant
body of research has investigated determinants of adoption of environmental management standards such as ISO
14001 (e.g., Boiral, 2007; Delmas, 2002; Jiang & Bansal,
2003) and participation in trade association-sponsored initiatives such as the Chemical Manufacturers Association’s
Responsible Care Program (Barnett & King, 2008; King &
Lenox, 2000; Lenox, 2006). This scholarship has generated significant insights and demonstrably advanced our understanding
of the diffusion and adoption of environmentally sustainable
practices.
A review of this literature suggests that institutional theorists have applied both interactive and determinant arguments in
examinations of the adoption of sustainable practices. Few studies, however, have attempted to empirically test the explanatory
power of both arguments. Accordingly, the goal of this article is to conduct such an examination. Specifically, I develop
competing hypotheses regarding organizational responsiveness
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In effect, determinant arguments emphasize uniformity in
response to institutional pressures, while interactive arguments
stress variation in response to those pressures. Oliver (1991)
suggests that the acquiescence inherent in determinant arguments represents only one possible outcome. Organizations may
instead pursue strategies of compromise, avoidance, defiance, or
manipulation. In a compromise strategy, for example, organizations may attempt to bargain and negotiate with stakeholders.
A possible avoidance strategy is escape, in which organizations might exit the domain in which pressure is applied. In an
example of defiance, organizations could aggressively challenge
the legality of regulations. Manipulation efforts might involve
advertising campaigns to influence changes in public opinion
(Oliver, 1991).
In short, the logic behind interactive arguments is that organizations need not simply acquiesce in the face of institutional
pressures. Multiple factors cause variation in responses to
pressures. Oliver (1991) identifies five such factors: cause, constituents, content, control, and context. These variables address
why a firm is pressured to conform, who applies the pressure,
to what requirement the firm is pressured, how the pressure
is exerted, and in what environmental context the pressure
is exerted (Oliver, 1991). Scholars have examined interactive
arguments in diverse empirical contexts such as security analysts’ investment ratings (Hayward & Boeker, 1998), long-term
incentive plans (Westphal & Zajac, 1998), and stock repurchase
plans (Westphal & Zajac, 2001).
The distinction between the determinant and interactive
strands of institutional theory—the former emphasizing uniformity of response and the latter emphasizing variation of
response—is apparent in sustainability research. Much of this
research has explored variation between or within organizational fields. An organizational field can be defined as “those
organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized
area of institutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148).
Organizations within the same industry, for example, can be
said to constitute a shared organizational field. Firms located
within the same state or nation may also be considered to share
a common organization field. Determinant arguments suggest
uniformity of response within a single field and, by extension,
variation of response between different fields. Interactive arguments, by contrast, suggest variation within a single field. The
distinction between determinant and interactive arguments in
sustainability research is explored in the following literature
review.

Determinant Arguments in Sustainability Research
Both determinant and interactive arguments have utilized
the dominant empirical contexts of ISO 14001 and trade association initiatives. Since its introduction in 1996, the ISO
14001 environmental management standard has become the
dominant model in environmental management (Boiral, 2007).
The standard, which is separate from ISO’s quality certification,
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has been adopted by more than 180,000 facilities worldwide
(International Organization for Standardization, 2009). ISO
14001 sets basic requirements for an environmental management system that firms must adopt to measure and capture their
impact on the natural environment, and represents a mechanism that a firm may use to implement an environmental policy
(Delmas, 2002).
In voluntary self-regulatory initiatives sponsored by trade
associations, firms within an industry regulate their collective
activities to avoid the specter of common threats (e.g., coercive action by governmental entities) or to promote a common
good through the establishment of standard codes of conduct (King and Lenox, 2000). Those initiatives whose raison
d’être involves environmental conduct can be viewed as means
to improve the collective environmental performance of firms
within the industry (Lenox and Nash, 2003). Common elements
of industry-specific initiatives include awareness by organizations of the danger of spillover effects in which negative media
coverage of one company adversely impacts all companies in
the industry, emergence of a crisis that threatens the industry, and articulation of delineated principles to which member
organizations consent (Barnett and King, 2008; Hoffman, 1999;
Lenox, 2006).
Much of the research in sustainability that invokes a determinant perspective builds upon Scott’s (2008b) three pillars
of institutions: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive.
Each of these pillars is associated with one of the three forms
of isomorphism proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983):
coercive, normative, and mimetic. The regulative pillar, associated with coercive isomorphism, would emphasize the role of
the state and political pressure in inducing uniformity within
organizational fields. The normative pillar, linked to normative
isomorphism, would describe the influence of norms shaped
by, for example, shared educational backgrounds of employees. And the cultural-cognitive pillar, associated with mimetic
isomorphism, would examine taken-for-granted responses to
situations of uncertainty, such as an organization’s choice to
imitate an action previously undertaken by competitors (Scott,
2008b). Each of these elements serves to explain why we might
expect to find variation between organizational fields rather
than within organizational fields; nations generating political pressures, employees with shared educational backgrounds
advising similar practices, and firms imitating the decisions
of their industry rivals may all yield the relative uniformity
within (and variation between) organizational fields suggested
by determinant arguments.
Delmas (2002) finds evidence of variation between organizational fields created by nations, lending support to the
determinant strand of institutional theory. The finding that
rates of ISO 14001 adoption differed between nations suggests that the institutional pressures associated with the three
pillars, in turn, differed between nations. With respect to
the regulative pillar, European governments committed themselves to supporting the diffusion of ISO 14001 through

88

J. GAUTHIER

provision of technical assistance and other methods. By contrast, the U.S. government did not exhibit such commitment.
The result that adoption rates were significantly higher in
Europe than in the United States indicates variation between
fields, providing support to determinant arguments (Delmas,
2002).
Concerning the significance of the cultural-cognitive pillar, uncertainty about the potential efficiency gains arising
from ISO 14001 may have led firms to identify which of
their competitors adopted the standard as a basis for their
own adoption or non-adoption decisions. The lower underlying adoption rate among U.S. firms, in part resulting from
lower governmental commitment to ISO’s diffusion, would
suggest that imitation of competitors’ practices would result
in a higher rate of imitative adoptions in Europe. Regarding
the normative pillar, differences in educational backgrounds
and values between U.S. and European employees, which may
influence differences in perceptions of the importance of process relative to performance, could further account for different
adoption rates (Delmas, 2002). In summary, regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive aspects of the organizational
environment may determine firms’ adoption decisions (Delmas,
2002).
Additional studies have similarly found that all three aspects
of the organizational environment combine to determine adoption decisions. The conclusion that firms that have adopted
quality management standards are more likely to adopt environmental management standards (King & Lenox, 2001) is difficult
to interpret. It could be viewed in either cultural-cognitive or
normative terms. In addition, regulative explanations, though
perhaps not as clear, should not be ruled out. Such findings illustrate the difficulty of empirically isolating the effects of different
institutional pillars.
Many organizational theorists, notably U.S. scholars, have
exhibited a tendency to disproportionately emphasize the role
of mimetic pressures (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999), in which, as
previously noted, firms imitate the decisions of competitors
within their organizational field. By contrast, much of the
sustainability scholarship has emphasized the role of coercive
isomorphism, in which political pressures create uniformity
within organizational fields. Jiang and Bansal (2003) find that
coercive pressures appear to explain organizational adoption
of environmental management systems. Rivera and de Leon
(2004) investigate the rise in a prominent trade association
initiative within the U.S. ski industry and find that federal
oversight, demands of state regulatory agencies, pressure from
local environmental groups, and public opinion exerted coercive influences upon the ski industry. These findings suggest that conformity may arise through organizational fields
shaped by industry. The resulting initiative, the Sustainable
Slopes Program, was established by the National Ski Areas
Association to promote beyond compliance principles encompassing 21 areas of environmental management (Rivera & de
Leon, 2004).

Interactive Arguments in Sustainability Research
As with scholarship that invokes a determinant perspective,
research utilizing an interactive perspective has examined both
the ISO 14001 standard and trade association initiatives. A transitional work by Jiang and Bansal (2003) employed both determinant and interactive arguments in the study of ISO 14001.
As previously noted, these authors found that coercive pressures
appeared to explain adoption of environmental management
systems. They distinguished, however, between adoption of
an in-house system and the decision to certify under ISO.
Certification was seen as a strategic decision in cases in which
the firm’s task visibility and environmental impact opacity were
high (Jiang & Bansal, 2003).
Boiral’s (2007) comparative case study of organizations
adopting ISO 14001 revealed different strategic responses to
institutional pressures for adoption, consistent with Oliver’s
(1991) contention that strategic responses to institutional processes vary based on certain predictive factors. Invoking core
elements of Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) work, Boiral depicts
ISO 14001 as a rational myth in which firms often adopt ceremonial behaviors to demonstrate conformity to the standard.
He sees that adoption was often rationalized and legitimized
through discourse that created a façade of conformity, rationality, and success that was, to some extent, decoupled from the
firm’s day-to-day practices. Strategies for firm integration of
ISO 14001 varied based on the level of institutional pressure
exerted and degree of employee involvement in the standard.
A strategy of ritual integration was associated with high pressure but low involvement. Decoupled integration (representing
a near-complete abandonment of the standard) occurred under
low pressure and low involvement. A mobilized integration
strategy was linked to high pressure and high involvement.
And proactive integration occurred under low pressure and
high involvement (Boiral, 2007). Thus, organizational adaptation to institutional pressures was not marked by homogeneous
responses. These findings, based on facilities whose firms share
common organizational fields, stand in contrast to determinant arguments by identifying varying organizational responses
under different conditions.
King, Lenox, and Terlaak (2005) refined and extended this
theory of strategic response. ISO certification, they posited,
is a symbolic act that implies information about otherwise
hidden organizational characteristics. Firms were seen as conducting a strategic consideration of the information needs and
strategies of other actors when formulating a response to institutional pressures in favor of certification. Specifically, firms
were found to be more likely to seek certification when they
expect potential exchange partners to lack information or fear
opportunism. In these cases, certification becomes a symbolic
act that reveals the presence of an underlying environmental
management system. Such systems, in turn, imply improvement
in environmental performance to exchange partners. Empirical
analysis, however, demonstrated that firms that certified did not
have significantly higher environmental performance than firms
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that did not certify (King et al., 2005). These findings suggest
that marketing considerations may factor into adoption decisions. As with Boiral’s (2007) findings, evidence of strategic
response to institutional pressures is revealed, and decoupling
of symbol and substance is suggested.
Two additional studies are illustrative of an interactive perspective in the application of institutional theory to ISO 14001.
Delmas and Toffel (2004) asked, “Why do organizations subject to the same level of institutional pressure pursue different
strategies?” (p. 210). Heterogeneous environmental practices
were proposed to result from different interpretations of institutional pressures. These different interpretations, in turn, were
suggested to emanate from differences in organizational structure, strategic position, financial condition, and environmental
performance (Delmas & Toffel, 2004). In subsequent research,
Delmas and Toffel (2008) noted the phenomenon of persistent
differences among organizations that share common organizational fields. Differences in firm response to institutional
pressures to adopt environmental management practices were
theorized to persist because firms channel these pressures to
different organizational functions, such as legal or marketing
divisions. And different functional divisions were suggested to
be more receptive to different types of constituents (Delmas
& Toffel, 2008). As such research in the context of ISO
14001 indicates, there is indeed a rich tradition of scholarship that explores varying responses to institutional pressures.
The common element in this research is that certain underlying elements are hypothesized to account for heterogeneity of
responses.
This commonality also exists in the context of trade association initiatives. While some scholars have employed determinant arguments in understanding the formation of such
initiatives (e.g., Rivera & de Leon, 2004), other research
has used interactive arguments in explaining the operation of
the initiatives. For example, King and Lenox (2000) found
that the potential for opportunistic behavior overcomes isomorphic pressures in trade association initiatives. Specifically,
the Chemical Manufacturers Association Responsible Care
Program showed evidence of strategic behavior. Participating
firms polluted more than comparable firms within the industry,
and their rates of environmental improvement slowed after the
creation of the program (King & Lenox, 2000). These results
suggest that participation in a trade association may be a strategic response to institutional pressures for stricter environmental
standards. Participating firms ceremoniously join in a desire
to gain legitimacy, and subsequently decouple symbol from
substance.
Additional research indicates that trade association initiatives acquire value over time, regardless of evidence of
decoupling. Lenox (2006) found that the Responsible Care
Program created value through improved investor perceptions
and corresponding increases in market capitalization. This value
accrued to both participants and nonparticipants within the
chemical industry, despite evidence of opportunistic behavior
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among participants (Lenox, 2006). This suggests that firms
within the industry may have attained a degree of legitimacy
through the existence of the initiative, indicating a potential
ceremonial nature to adoption. Firms that acquire environmental legitimacy have been found to incur less unsystematic
stock-market risk than illegitimate firms (Bansal & Clelland,
2004). Barnett and King (2008) also determined that the
Responsible Care Program generated value. They concluded
that spillover harm from industrial accidents, as defined by
stock price declines of chemical companies, decreased after
the creation of the program (Barnett & King, 2008). These
results echo Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) finding that stock
repurchase plans and long-term incentive plans acquired a
symbolic value over time, despite evidence of decoupling.
Similarly, trade association initiatives have acquired a symbolic worth that creates value for all firms within the corresponding industry, despite evidence of opportunism (Lenox,
2006).
The review in this section has demonstrated that determinant and interactive perspectives in institutional theory are
useful lenses through which to view sustainability in organizations. The literature that has invoked these perspectives has
contributed significantly to our understanding of organizational
adoption and diffusion of sustainable practices. The notion of
ceremonial adoption versus committed adoption is useful in
suggesting that firms exhibit varying levels of responsiveness
to desires for sustainable practices. A specific comparison of
ceremonial and committed behaviors, however, is beyond the
scope of the article’s empirical test. Rather, this study seeks
to understand whether determinant or interactive arguments are
more salient in firms’ adoption decisions, and the issue of variation between versus within organizational fields is central to
this understanding. Hence, the next section develops competing
hypotheses for each view of adoption.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Determinant Arguments
Institutional pressures are exerted, in part, through the proliferation of shared norms within a given social context. DiMaggio
and Powell (1983) note that isomorphism tends to be strongest
within an organizational field. Given that states are among
the entities that constitute organizational fields, we would
expect that coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures to adopt
sustainable practices may arise at the state level. Coercive pressures may arise from the political culture of a state, which may
induce the need for firms to secure legitimacy within that distinct culture through adoption. Mimetic pressures may also exist
at the state level, as firms copy the adoption decision of other
firms within a given geographic proximity. Normative pressures
may result from professionalization at the level of state, as local
trade associations promote socialization and the proliferation of
shared norms with respect to sustainable practices.
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State political leaders are both a reflection of and a driver of
state-level differences in environmental awareness (cf. Kolk &
Perego, 2010). A review of the League of Conservation Voters
National Environmental Scorecard reveals substantial differences in environmental voting records between states. Insofar
as legitimacy is an organizational imperative (Suchman, 1995)
and differences exist in prevailing norms between states, we
would expect the adoption of sustainable practices to be more
common among firms based in more environmentally proactive
states. Stated differently, a firm will seek to achieve congruency between its environmental practices and the environmental
culture of its state. These arguments lead to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The adoption of sustainable practices will be
more likely among organizations based in more environmentally proactive states.
Response to institutional pressures is also determined by the
industry context in which those pressures are exerted (Oliver,
1991). Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested that conformity
may buffer organizations from conditions of environmental
turbulence. As uncertainty in the organizational environment
decreases, organizational confidence increases and the desire
to seek protection through conformity to institutional norms
becomes less urgent (Oliver, 1991). Uncertainty is a critical dimension that may explain adoption and diffusion of
sustainable practices. Uncertainty differs by industry, suggesting that organizational fields shaped by industry may account
for differences in the adoption of sustainable practices.
The diffusion of LEED sustainable building standards illustrates the impact of uncertainty. As uncertainty in a firm’s organizational environment decreases, the firm may be less inclined
to signal conformance to norms of sustainability through LEED
adoption. This response is consistent with notions of conformity
as a buffer from environmental turbulence; with less environmental uncertainty, the need for conformity is reduced (Oliver,
1991). Indeed, a review of LEED adoption rates by industry reveals that firms in more stable and predictable industry
environments (e.g., insurance) have lower rates of adoption
(USGBC, 2009). The examples of trade association initiatives
and LEED leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The adoption of sustainable practices will be
less likely among organizations operating in industries
characterized by greater stability.
Interactive Arguments
The cause of institutional pressures for adoption of
sustainable practices may result from legitimacy-seeking motivations. If an organization believes that its legitimacy will be
enhanced by conforming to pressures, then it will be more likely
to acquiesce (Oliver, 1991).
Multiple groups have, for example, exerted pressure on
organizations to quantify and disclose their greenhouse gas

emissions. Climate change activists have actively lobbied firms
to improve their disclosure practices concerning greenhouse
gas emissions (Reid & Toffel, 2009). Leading management
journals such as Harvard Business Review have argued that
the quantification of emissions through tools such as the
Greenhouse Gas Protocol represents an important step in mitigating climate-related risks (Lash & Wellington, 2007). The
Carbon Disclosure Project, a nongovernmental organization,
conducts annual surveys of top management regarding their
firms’ greenhouse gas emissions and climate-related risks,
opportunities, and strategies (Reid & Toffel, 2009). Consultants
such as McKinsey & Co. have urged firms to develop proactive strategies to address climate change (Enkvist et al.,
2008).
Management literature concerning sustainable practices
notes that firms are not equally responsive to such external pressures. Larger firms will tend to be more responsive, given that
their increased visibility makes them easier targets of external
pressure. Size is one manner in which variation may exist within
the same organizational field. Within the organizational field
constituted by a particular industry or state, for example, we
would expect larger firms to be more responsive than smaller
firms. Bowen’s (2000) examination of environmental visibility
revealed that 9 out of 10 relevant studies showed organization
size and environmental performance to be positively associated.
Rogers’s (2003) work on the diffusion of innovations found
that organizational size and likelihood of innovation adoption
are positively associated. This logic leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Larger organizations will be more likely to adopt
sustainable practices than smaller organizations.
An organization’s constituents represent sources of institutional pressures. The existence of conflicting pressures from
different sources is a common problem in organizations (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978). A strategy of acquiescence to institutional pressures is, of course, extremely problematic when
faced with conflicting pressures (Oliver, 1991). Acquiescence
becomes less likely in cases of low external dependence on
constituents. Organizational perceptions of constituent power
influence the sustainability practices that firms adopt (Sharma
& Henriques, 2005). Stakeholder pressure is also an important component of determinant arguments. But while determinant arguments would suggest that stakeholder pressure
creates uniformity within an organizational field, interactive arguments suggest that different organizations within the
same organizational field may choose to perceive stakeholder
pressures differently. These different perceptions of pressure
ultimately create variation within the same organizational
field.
For example, consumers are powerful constituents whose
actions determine the survival of final market firms. Proximity
to consumers varies within the same organizational field.
For instance, Oracle and Microsoft operate in the same
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industry, within the same states, but Microsoft is significantly
closer to the end consumer than Oracle. Recent polls suggest
that consumers exhibit behaviors that reflect a growing
sustainability consciousness (Harris Interactive, 2009). Eightythree percent of respondents in a recent survey stated that a company’s commitment to sustainable business practices is very
or somewhat important in their purchasing decisions (Capstrat,
2009). By contrast, business-to-business firms’ customers, commercial and industrial buyers, are primarily profit driven and
hence less concerned with sustainability. To the extent that management perceives environmentally conscious consumers as a
more powerful constituency than others who may not value
sustainability, the organization will be more likely to adopt
sustainable practices. Indeed, Fairfield, Harmon, and Behson
(2011) found that a lack of external stakeholder demand for
sustainability serves to diminish organizational implementation of sustainability practices. This discussion leads to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: When organizations perceive greater power in
constituents who promote sustainable practices than in
those who resist, those organizations will be more likely
to adopt sustainable practices.

METHODS
Sample
Because the article’s hypotheses required a large sample of
U.S. firms, the S&P 500 was used as the sample. Constituent
companies were drawn from the end-of-year 2009 list. In total,
391 companies remained in the sample after removing firms
with missing data. The distribution of the sample by industry
and state is presented in Table 1.
Dependent Variable
The variable used to operationalize adoption of sustainable
practices was adoption of Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
guidelines. The GRI has become the world’s leading voluntary
sustainability reporting system (Brown et al., 2007). The GRI’s
mission is to increase the rigor and acceptance of sustainability
reporting through the promotion of common guidelines (Willis,
2003). A company that adopts GRI guidelines signals its commitment to the environmental, social, and economic pillars of
sustainability. As such, GRI adoption may be seen, in part, as
a measure of adoption of sustainable practices. GRI adoption
information as of year-end 2010, coded as 1 for adopters and

TABLE 1
Distribution of sample by industry and state
Industry (NAICS sector)
33: Manufacturing
52: Finance and insurance
32: Manufacturing
22: Utilities
44: Retail trade
31: Manufacturing
51: Information
21: Mining
45: Retail trade
54: Professional, scientific, and technical services
48: Transportation and warehousing
72: Accommodation and food services
62: Health care and social assistance
53: Real estate and rental and leasing
56: Admininstration and support and waste
management and remediation services
42: Wholesale trade
49: Transportation and warehousing
71: Arts, entertainment, and recreation
Total

Frequency

State
(HQ)

Frequency

93
58
52
35
29
25
18
16
14
12
10
9
7
5
4

CA
NY
TX
PA
IL
MN
OH
NJ
GA
VA
MA
NC
CT
FL
WI

51
43
38
23
22
20
20
19
13
13
12
11
10
9
9

2
1
1

MI
MO
All other
states

8
8
62

Total

391

391

Note. Sample based on end-of-year 2009 S&P 500 components. NAICS, North American
Classification System; HQ, headquarters.
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0 for nonadopters, was obtained from a database of adopting
firms maintained by the GRI.
It is worth noting that GRI adoption is publicly available
information that does not present the level of data that a survey or in-depth qualitative study would be able to render. GRI
adoption is action that is visible to external stakeholders; other
actions that may be interpreted as a more profound commitment
to sustainability, such as internal process changes undertaken
to reduce emissions, lack such visibility. In the absence of
access to internal data, adoption of GRI guidelines—the leading
sustainability reporting system—may be viewed as a suitable
metric for the exploratory nature of this article’s research.
It should also be noted that “adoption” should be interpreted as formation, rather than as both formation and operation,
for the purposes of this article. In the context of the article’s
dependent variable, this results in GRI adoption being measured
as a dichotomy. Were both formation and operation taken into
account, a company’s specific GRI application level, which represents the extent of adherence to the GRI’s suggested reporting
framework, would also be measured. By measuring adoption
as a dichotomy and developing hypotheses based on variation between fields as compared to variation within fields,
determinant and interactive arguments are able to be separated.

Independent Variables
An assessment of the voting records of state elected officials
by the League of Conservation Voters National Environmental
Scorecard, a source that has been widely used in sustainability
research (e.g., Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Hamilton, 1997;
Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002), was used to operationalize states.
The scorecard assigns ratings to U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives members, based on votes on issues concerning
climate, clean energy, water, public lands, and wildlife conservation. Every legislator is given a score from 0 to 100, and a
mean legislator score is then published for both the House and
Senate. The score used in the analysis was the mean score of
both houses of Congress for each state in 2009. The state of
the firm’s headquarters was used in the analysis. Data availability constraints prevented the use of alternative metrics, such
as a weighted average state score based on revenues obtained
from residents or businesses in each state. Given the importance
of maintaining legitimacy within the state in which the firm is
headquartered, headquarters location constitutes an appropriate
operationalization.
The National Environmental Scorecard has been used in previous management research as a measure of political pressure
at the state level (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Kassinis & Vafeas,
2002). Given that the scorecard is based on federal-level votes,
however, other potential measures of a state’s general level
of environmentalism were considered. Therefore, the model
was also run using online directory Greenopia’s 2011 state
sustainability ratings (based on water and air quality, recycling
rates, number of LEED buildings, green business density, per

capita energy and water consumption, per-capita emissions and
waste generation, and renewable energy statistics) and Forbes’s
2007 (the only year in which Forbes conducted the ratings)
America’s Greenest States ratings (based on water and air
quality, carbon footprint, policy initiatives, hazardous waste
management, and energy consumption). Finding no significant
difference in results among the alternatives, I retained the
National Environmental Scorecard as the data source most
commonly used in prior research.
To operationalize industry stability, I used industry
dynamism, calculated by regressing time against industry sales
for five years (2005–2009), in the manner suggested by Dean
and Snell (1996). I divided the standard error of the resulting
regression slope coefficient by the mean value for sales to arrive
at the value for industry dynamism. Industry sales data used to
calculate dynamism was secured from Compustat. Dynamism is
a commonly accepted measure of industry stability and has been
widely used in management research (Dess & Beard, 1984;
Lepak et al., 2003; McNamara et al., 2003).
Consistent with prior scholars’ operationalization of firm
size (e.g., Baysinger et al., 1991; Tallman and Li, 1996), I
used firm sales, drawn from Compustat for the year 2009, as a
proxy for firm size. Finally, constituent power was operationalized by segmenting each firm according to whether it sold any
amount of goods or services to consumers. Company websites
and 10-K filings were reviewed for indications that any products or services could be purchased by consumers. Following
Haddock-Fraser and Tourelle (2010), firms selling any goods or
services to consumers received a value of 1, while those selling exclusively to other businesses received a value of 0. While
the percentage of revenues obtained from consumers relative to
businesses would have enabled a more precise metric, differences in company reporting conventions prevented these data
from being obtained.
Control Variables
The effect of potential confounding variables was also considered. Given the potential for leverage, firm profitability, and
firm age to impact adoption, I operationalized each as a control
variable. Leverage was operationalized as the ratio of longterm debt to total assets as of year-end 2009. Profitability was
operationalized using year 2009 return on assets (ROA), return
on equity (ROE), and return on sales (ROS). I measured firm
age using the number of years since incorporation as of yearend 2009. Information for control variables was drawn from
Mergent Online and Compustat, using year-end 2009 data.
Analysis
Consistent with previous analyses of adoption of environmental reporting practices (Reid & Toffel, 2009), I used logistic
regression to test the hypotheses. In models with a dichotomous
dependent variable, such as this article’s, logistic regression is
warranted.
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RESULTS
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for
the sample, and Table 3 displays the results of the logistic
regression analysis. The model was significant, with a chisquared statistic of 48.9 (p < .01). Hypothesis 1 predicted that
organizations in more environmentally proactive states would
be more likely to adopt sustainable practices. Results indicate that state was not significant, thus offering no support
for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 predicted that organizations in
industries marked by greater stability would be less likely to
adopt sustainable practices. Industry dynamism was not significant, providing no support for Hypothesis 2. Hence, neither
of the hypotheses centering on determinant arguments was
supported.
Hypothesis 3 argued that larger organizations would be more
likely to adopt sustainable practices than smaller organizations.

Firm size was significant (p < .05), indicating support for
the hypothesis. Finally, Hypothesis 4 contended that organizations perceiving greater power in constituents supportive of
sustainable practices would be more likely to adopt sustainable
practices. Perceived constituent power was significant (p < .05).
Thus, each of the hypotheses based on interactive arguments
was supported.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Motivations for adoption of sustainable practices have been
explored using two broad strands of institutional theory: determinant and interactive arguments. The goal of this study was
to conduct an empirical test of both arguments to understand
which strand of institutional theory may be more salient for
corporate sustainability research. Thus, I developed two sets

TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

1 GRI
2 State
3 Industry
4 Firm size
5 Constituents
6 Leverage
7 ROE
8 ROA
9 ROS
10 Firm age

.27
138.16
.02
18,068
.62
.20
.24
.05
.07
49.40

.45
50.90
.02
33,608
.49
.14
1.71
.06
.11
35.69

.02
.02
.18∗∗
.14∗∗
.05
−.04
.09
.09
−.25∗∗

−.15∗∗
.05
.08
−.13∗
.07
.13∗
.19∗∗
.11∗

.13∗
−.14∗∗
−.05
−.04
−.26∗∗
−.15∗∗
−.07

.17∗∗
−.06
−.02
.01
−.05
.15∗∗

.01
−.04
.12∗
.14∗∗
−.03

6

7

TABLE 3
Logistic regression results for GRI adoption
Coefficient

Standard error

State
Industry
Firm size
Constituents
Leverage
ROE
ROA
ROS
Firm age
Constant

−.001
6.158
.000∗
.564∗
1.452
−.608
19.479
2.410
.015∗∗
−2.846∗∗

.003
5.473
.000
.272
.950
.518
23.819
1.636
.003
.550

Pseudo-R2 = .170
χ 2 = 48.90∗∗
Note. N = 391.
∗
p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01.

Significance
.693
.261
.035
.038
.126
.240
.413
.141
.000
.000

9

.11∗
−.21∗∗ .17∗∗
−.21∗∗ .09
.67∗∗
.07
.04
.06
−.01

Note. N = 391.
∗
p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01.

Variable

8

Odds ratio
.999
472.381
1.000
1.757
4.273
.544
2.880
11.136
1.015
.058
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of competing hypotheses. The first two hypotheses, invoking
determinant arguments centered on variation between organizational fields, argued that adoption of sustainable practices
would be more likely among firms in more environmentally
proactive states and less likely among firms in industries with
greater stability. The second two hypotheses, developed through
interactive arguments for variation within organizational fields,
suggested that adoption would be more likely among larger
firms and more likely among firms that perceive greater power
in constituents who promote sustainable practices.
The results of my analysis revealed no support for the
hypotheses built on determinant arguments, but strong support
for the hypotheses grounded in interactive arguments. Thus, the
results of the analysis suggest a significant difference between
the explanatory power of the two strands of institutional theory.
In summary, interactive arguments better predicted institutional
behavior than determinant arguments.
This study offers implications for scholars, practitioners, and
policymakers. For scholars, the support for interactive arguments suggests that institutional theory’s move from determinant to interactive arguments is empirically justified. Although
studies of firms based outside the United States may find
greater support for the determinant strand of institutional theory, researchers seeking to explain the adoption of sustainable
practices among U.S. firms would be well advised to focus on
interactive arguments. Frameworks such as Oliver’s (1991) may
prove especially useful for sustainability scholars.
From a theoretical standpoint, the article’s finding that interactive, rather than determinant, arguments are supported reveals
new opportunities for inquiry. A particularly promising area for
future research might examine the role of strategic cognition in
creating variation within organizational fields. Strategic cognition concerns the relationship between cognitive structures—
including top management’s beliefs with respect to strategy
and the organizational environment—and decision processes
in strategic management (Porac & Thomas, 2002). A recent
review of strategic cognition literature finds that scholars have
examined strategic cognition at the individual, group, organizational, and industry levels of analysis (Narayanan et al., 2011).
A potential future study at the individual level of analysis could
explore the role of the top manager’s cognitive structures in
influencing responses to pressures to adopt sustainable practices. Empirical studies in this regard might seek to build on
earlier work utilizing causal mapping (e.g., Barr et al., 1992).
A logical extension of such studies would examine the effectiveness of various types of responses by constructing links to
organizational performance.
Practitioners may benefit from this study’s findings by recognizing the circumstances in which it is most advantageous
to adopt sustainable practices. Pressures to adopt sustainable
practices will increase as a firm’s visibility increases. As organizations grow or become increasingly consumer oriented, their
rising visibility heightens expectations for adoption. Firms
that resist pressures for adoption may find themselves at a

competitive disadvantage, as unsatisfied stakeholder groups
withdraw their support.
This article’s findings suggest potential methods that policymakers may use to encourage voluntary adoption of sustainable
practices. Given that state and industry were not significant,
policymakers may wish to reflect on the role that visibility plays
in encouraging adoption. Size and consumer orientation are two
measures of visibility that policymakers are unable to impact.
Media attention, however, is a measure of visibility that policymakers can influence. Policymakers can either seek to reward
adopters by disseminating lists of adopters to key media outlets, or can conversely punish nonadopters by conveying which
companies have chosen not to adopt certain environmentally
sustainable practices. Governments have an important role, in
concert with the media, in focusing public attention in such a
manner.
This article’s scope, limited to an examination of corporate
sustainability from the theoretical lens of institutional theory,
constitutes a limitation of this research. The objective of an indepth focus on institutional theory precluded a consideration of
strategic management scholarship. In addition, a cross-sectional
design was employed. Future research should incorporate longitudinal designs in evaluations of the adoption of sustainable
practices. Finally, only publicly available data were used in
the analysis. I hope to supplement these initial findings with
interviews and surveys in future work.
During the past few decades, institutional theory has shifted
from determinant to interactive arguments. Sustainability scholarship has reflected this shift. In this article, I considered
whether this change has, in fact, been warranted. The results of
my analysis illustrate the limitations of the determinant strand
of institutional theory. Future research should seek to extend
interactive arguments and, in so doing, facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of issues of interests and agency in
institutionalization.
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